How far are we from the slippery slope? The Laffer curve revisited by Trabandt, Mathias & Uhlig, Harald
Working PaPer SerieS
no 1174 / aPriL 2010
HoW Far are We  
From THe SLiPPery  
SLoPe? 
THe LaFFer Curve 
reviSiTed
by Mathias Trabandt 
and Harald UhligWORKING PAPER SERIES
NO 1174 / APRIL 2010
In 2010 all ECB 
publications 
feature a motif 
taken from the 
€500 banknote.
HOW FAR ARE WE FROM THE 
SLIPPERY SLOPE?
THE LAFFER CURVE REVISITED 1
by Mathias Trabandt 2
and Harald Uhlig 3
1   A number of people and seminar participants provided us with excellent comments, for which we are grateful, and a complete list would be rather 
long. Explicitly, we would like to thank Wouter DenHaan, Robert Hall, John Cochrane, Rick van der Ploeg and Richard Rogerson. This 
research was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 ”Economic Risk”, by the RTN network 
MAPMU (contract HPRNCT-2002-00237) and by the NSF grant SES-0922550. An early draft of this paper has been awarded 
with the CESifo Prize in Public Economics 2005. The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the 
authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the ECB or Sveriges Riksbank.
2   Fiscal Policies Division, European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, GERMANY and Sveriges Riksbank, 
e-mail: Mathias.Trabandt@ecb.europa.eu
3   Department of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, USA, NBER and CEPR, 
e-mail: huhlig@uchicago.edu
This paper can be downloaded without charge from http://www.ecb.europa.eu or from the Social Science 
Research Network electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1533409.
NOTE: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing 
the views of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
The views expressed are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB.© European Central Bank, 2010
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000 
All rights reserved. 
Any reproduction, publication and 
reprint in the form of a different 
publication, whether printed or produced 
electronically, in whole or in part, is 
permitted only with the explicit written 
authorisation of the ECB or the authors. 
Information on all of the papers published 
in the ECB Working Paper Series can be 





Working Paper Series No 1174
April 2010
Abstract  4
Non-technical summary  5
1 Introduction  7
2 The  model  9
2.1  The Constant Frisch Elasticity (CFE) 
preferences  12
2.2 Equilibrium  16
3  Calibration and parameterization  21
3.1  EU-14 model and individual EU countries  22
4 Results  24
4.1  Labor tax laffer curves  26
4.2  Capital tax laffer curves  28






Working Paper Series No 1174
April 2010
Abstract
We characterize the Laﬀer curves for labor taxation and capital income taxation quan-
titatively for the US, the EU-14 and individual European countries by comparing the
balanced growth paths of a neoclassical growth model featuring ”constant Frisch elastic-
ity” (CFE) preferences. We derive properties of CFE preferences. We provide new tax
rate data. For benchmark parameters, we ﬁnd that the US can increase tax revenues by
30% by raising labor taxes and 6% by raising capital income taxes. For the EU-14 we
obtain 8% and 1%. Denmark and Sweden are on the wrong side of the Laﬀer curve for
capital income taxation.
Key words: Laﬀer curve, incentives, dynamic scoring, US and EU-14 economy
JEL Classiﬁcation: E0, E60, H05
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Non-Technical Summary
How do tax revenues and production adjust, if labor taxes or capital income taxes are
changed? To answer this question, we characterize the Laﬀer curves for labor taxation
and capital income taxation quantitatively for the US, the EU-14 and individual European
countries by comparing the balanced growth paths of a neoclassical growth model, as
distortionary tax rates are varied.
We employ preferences which are consistent with long-run growth and which feature a
constant Frisch elasticity of labor supply, originally proposed by King and Rebelo (1999).
We call these CFE (“constant Frisch elasticity”) preferences and derive and calculate their
properties.
For the benchmark calibration with a Frisch elasticity of 1 and an intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution of 0.5, the US can increase tax revenues by 30% by raising labor
taxes and 6% by raising capital income taxes, while the same numbers for the EU-14 are
8% and 1%.
To provide this analysis requires values for the tax rates on labor, capital and con-
sumption. Following Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), we calculate new data for these
tax rates in the US and individual EU-14 countries for 1995 to 2007.
Denmark and Sweden are on the “wrong” side of the Laﬀer curve for capital income
taxation. By contrast, e.g. Germany could raise 10% more tax revenues by raising labor
taxes but only 2% by raising capital taxes. The same numbers for e.g. France are 5% and
0%, for Italy 4% and 0% and for Spain 13% and 2%.
We show that the ﬁscal eﬀect is indirect: by cutting capital income taxes, the biggest
contribution to total tax receipts comes from an increase in labor income taxation. We
show that lowering the capital income tax as well as raising the labor income tax results
in higher tax revenue in both the US and the EU-14, i.e. in terms of a “Laﬀer hill”, both
the US and the EU-14 are on the wrong side of the peak with respect to their capital tax
rates.6
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Following Mankiw and Weinzierl (2005), we pursue a dynamic scoring exercise. That
is, we analyze by how much a tax cut is self-ﬁnancing if we take incentive feedback eﬀects
into account. We ﬁnd that for the US model 32% of a labor tax cut and 51% of a capital
tax cut are self-ﬁnancing in the steady state. In the EU-14 economy 54% of a labor tax
cut and 79% of a capital tax cut are self-ﬁnancing.
February 2010, Mathias Trabandt7
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1 Introduction
How do tax revenues and production adjust, if labor taxes or capital income taxes are
changed? To answer this question, we characterize the Laﬀer curves for labor taxation and
capital income taxation quantitatively for the US, the1 EU-14 and individual European
countries by comparing the balanced growth paths of a neoclassical growth model, as
tax rates are varied. The government collects distortionary taxes on labor, capital and
consumption and issues debt to ﬁnance government consumption, lump-sum transfers and
debt repayments.
We employ a preference speciﬁcation which is consistent with long-run growth and
which features a constant Frisch elasticity of labor supply, originally proposed by King
and Rebelo (1999). We call these CFE (“constant Frisch elasticity”) preferences. We
calculate and discuss their properties as well as discuss the implications for the cross-
elasticity of consumption and labor as emphasized by Hall (2008), which should prove
useful beyond the question at hand. To our knowledge, this has not been done previously
in the literature and therefore provides an additional key contribution of this paper.
For the benchmark calibration with a Frisch elasticity of 1 and an intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution of 0.5, the US can increase tax revenues by 30% by raising labor taxes
and 6% by raising capital income taxes, while the same numbers for the EU-14 are 8% and
1%. We furthermore calculate the the degree of self-ﬁnancing of tax cuts and provide a
sensitivity analysis for the parameters. To provide this analysis requires values for the tax
rates on labor, capital and consumption. Following Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), we
calculate new data for these tax rates in the US and individual EU-14 countries for 1995
to 2007 and provide their values in appendix A: these too should be useful beyond the
question investigated in this paper.
In 1974 Arthur B. Laﬀer noted during a business dinner that “there are always two
tax rates that yield the same revenues”.2 Subsequently, the incentive eﬀects of tax cuts
was given more prominence in political discussions and political practice. We ﬁnd that
there is a Laﬀer curve in standard neoclassical growth models with respect to both capital
1For data availability reasons, we could not include Luxembourg in our analysis. Therefore, we refer to the
EU-14 rather than the EU-15.
2see Wanniski (1978).8
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taxation and labor income taxation. According to our quantitative results, Denmark and
Sweden indeed are on the “wrong” side of the Laﬀer curve for capital income taxation.
Following Mankiw and Weinzierl (2005), we pursue a dynamic scoring exercise. That
is, we analyze by how much a tax cut is self-ﬁnancing if we take incentive feedback eﬀects
into account. We ﬁnd that for the US model 32% of a labor tax cut and 51% of a capital
tax cut are self-ﬁnancing in the steady state. In the EU-14 economy 54% of a labor tax
cut and 79% of a capital tax cut are self-ﬁnancing.
We show that the ﬁscal eﬀect is indirect: by cutting capital income taxes, the biggest
contribution to total tax receipts comes from an increase in labor income taxation. We
show that lowering the capital income tax as well as raising the labor income tax results
in higher tax revenue in both the US and the EU-14, i.e. in terms of a “Laﬀer hill”, both
the US and the EU-14 are on the wrong side of the peak with respect to their capital tax
rates.
There is a considerable literature on this topic, but our contribution diﬀers from the ex-
isting results in several dimensions. Baxter and King (1993) employ a neoclassical growth
model with productive government capital to analyze the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. Garcia-
Mila, Marcet, and Ventura (2001) use a neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous
agents to study the welfare impacts of alternative tax schemes on labor and capital.
Lindsey (1987) has measured the response of taxpayers to the US tax cuts from 1982 to
1984 empirically, and has calculated the degree of self-ﬁnancing. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(1997) show that there exists a Laﬀer curve in a neoclassical growth model, but focus on
endogenous labor taxes to balance the budget, in contrast to the analysis here. Ireland
(1994) shows that there exists a dynamic Laﬀer curve in an AK endogenous growth model
framework, with their results debated in Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), Novales and Ruiz
(2002) and Agell and Persson (2001). In an overlapping generations framework, Yanagawa
and Uhlig (1996) show that higher capital income taxes may lead to faster growth, in
contrast to the conventional economic wisdom. Floden and Linde (2001) contains a Laﬀer
curve analysis. Jonsson and Klein (2003) calculate the total welfare costs of distortionary
taxes including inﬂation. They ﬁnd them to be ﬁve times higher in Sweden than the
US, and that Sweden is on the slippery slope side of the Laﬀer curve for several tax
instruments. Our results are in line with these ﬁndings, with a sharper focus on the9
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1174
April 2010
location and quantitative importance of the Laﬀer curve with respect to labor and capital
income taxes.
Our paper is closely related to Prescott (2002, 2004), who raised the issue of the
incentive eﬀects of taxes by comparing the eﬀects of labor taxes on labor supply for the
US and European countries. We broaden that analysis here by including incentive eﬀects
of labor and capital income taxes in a general equilibrium framework with endogenous
transfers. Their work has been discussed by e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006), Blanchard
(2004) as well as Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005). The dynamic scoring approach
of Mankiw and Weinzierl (2005) has been discussed by Leeper and Yang (2005).
Like Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Baxter and King (1993), McGrattan (1994),
Lansing (1998), Cassou and Lansing (2006), Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2004) as well
as Trabandt (2006), we assume that government spending may be valuable only insofar as
it provides utility separably from consumption and leisure.
The paper is organized as follows. We specify the model in section 2 and its param-
eterization in section 3. Section 4 discusses our results. Further details are contained in
the appendix as well as in a technical appendix.
2 The Model
Time is discrete, t =0 ,1,...,∞. The representative household maximizes the discounted








t )ct + xt + bt =( 1 − τn
t )wtnt +( 1− τk
t )(dt − δ)kt−1
+δkt−1 + Rb
tbt−1 + st +Π t +m t
kt =( 1 − δ)kt−1 + xt10
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where ct, nt, kt, xt, bt,m t denote consumption, hours worked, capital, investment, gov-
ernment bonds and an exogenous stream of payments. The household takes government
consumption gt, which provides utility, as given. Further, the household receives wages wt,
dividends dt,p r o ﬁ t sΠ t from the ﬁrm and asset payments mt. Moreover, the household
obtains interest earnings Rb
t and lump-sum transfers st from the government. The house-
hold has to pay consumption taxes τc
t , labor income taxes τn
t and capital income taxes τk
t .
Note that capital income taxes are levied on dividends net-of-depreciation as in Prescott
(2002, 2004) and in line with Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994).
Note further that we assume there to be an asset (“tree”), paying a constant stream of
payments mt, growing at the balanced growth rate of the economy. We allow the payments
to be negative and thereby allow the asset to be a liability. This feature captures a
permanently negative or positive trade balance, equating mt to net imports, and introduces
international trade in a minimalist way. As we shall concentrate on balanced growth path
equilibria, this model is therefore consistent with an open-economy interpretation with
source-based capital income taxation, where the rest of the world grows at the same rate
and features households with the same time preferences. Indeed, the trade balance plays
a role in the reaction of steady state labor to tax changes and therefore for the shape of
the Laﬀer curve. For transitional issues, additional details become relevant. Our model is
a closed economy. Labor immobility between the US and the EU-14 is probably a good
approximation. For capital, this may be justiﬁed with the Feldstein and Horioka (1980)
observation that domestic saving and investment are highly correlated or by interpreting
the model in the light of ownership-based taxation instead of source-based taxation. In
both cases changes in ﬁscal policy will have only minor cross border eﬀects. For explicit
tax policy in open economies, see e.g Mendoza and Tesar (1998) or Kim and Kim (2004)
and the references therein.
The representative ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts subject to a Cobb-Douglas production
technology,





where ξt denotes the trend of total factor productivity.11
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The government faces the budget constraint,
gt + st + Rb
tbt−1 = bt + Tt (3)
where government tax revenues Tt are
Tt = τc
t ct + τn
t wtnt + τk
t (dt − δ)kt−1. (4)
Our goal is to analyze how the equilibrium shifts, as tax rates are shifted. We focus
on the comparison of balanced growth paths. Assume that
mt = ψt ¯ m (5)
where ψ is the growth factor of aggregate output. Our key assumption is that government
debt as well as government spending do not deviate from their balanced growth pathes,
i.e.
bt−1 = ψt¯ b (6)
and
gt = ψt¯ g (7)
When tax rates are shifted, government transfers adjust according to the government
budget constraint (3), rewritten as
st = ψt¯ b(ψ − Rb
t)+Tt − ψt¯ g. (8)
As an alternative, we shall also consider keeping transfers on the balanced growth path
and adjusting government spending instead.
More generally, the tax rates may be interpreted as wedges as in Chari, Kehoe, and
Mcgrattan (2007), and some of the results in this paper carry over to that more general
interpretation. What is special to the tax rate interpretation and crucial to the analysis
in this paper, however, is the link between tax receipts and transfers (or government
spending) via the government budget constraint.12
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2.1 The Constant Frisch Elasticity (CFE) preferences
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution as well as the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
are key properties of the preferences for the analysis at hand.
As a benchmark, it is reasonable to assume that preferences are separable in consump-
tion and labor. Further, we do not wish to restrict ourselves to a unit intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. To avoid spurious wealth eﬀects that are inconsistent with long-
run observations, we need to impose that the preferences are consistent with long-run
growth (i.e. consistent with a constant labor supply as wages and consumption grow at
the same rate). We furthermore wish to allow for variation in the supply elasticity for
labor. It is then natural to focus on preferences with a constant intertemporal elasticity







We shall call preferences with these features “constant Frisch elasticity” preferences
or CFE preferences. As this paper makes considerable use of these preferences, we shall
investigate their properties in some detail. The following result has essentially been stated
in King and Rebelo (1999), equation (6.7) as well Shimer (2008), but without a proof.
Proposition 1 Suppose preferences are separable across time with a twice continuously
diﬀerentiable felicity function u(c,n), which is strictly increasing and concave in c and
−n, discounted a constant rate β, consistent with long-run growth and feature a constant
Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϕ, and suppose that there is an interior solution to the
ﬁrst-order condition. Then, the preferences feature a constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitution 1/η > 0 and are given by
u(c,n)=l o g ( c) − κn
1+ 1
ϕ (10)














if η>0,η  =1 ,w h e r eκ>0, up to aﬃne transformations. Conversely, this felicity
function has the properties stated above.13
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Proof: It is well known that consistency with long run growth implies that the
preferences feature a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/η > 0 and are of
the form









where v(n) is increasing (decreasing) in n iﬀ η>1 (η<1). We concentrate on the second
equation. Interpret w to be the net-of-the-tax-wedge wage, i.e. w = ((1 −τn)/(1 +τc)) ˜ w,
where ˜ w is the gross wage and where τn and τc are the (constant) tax rates on labor income
and consumption. Taking the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to a budget constraint
c + ...= wn + ...
we obtain the two ﬁrst order conditions
λ = c−ηv(n) (14)
−(1 − η)λw = c1−ηv (n) (15)

















The constant elasticity ϕ of labor with respect to wages implies that n is positively propor-













for some ξ1 > 0, which may depend on λ. Substitute this equation into (16). With λ
constant, integrate the resulting equation to obtain





3The authors are grateful to Robert Shimer, who pointed out this simpliﬁcation of the proof.14
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for some integrating constant ξ0.N o t et h a tξ0 > 0 in order to assure that the left-hand
side is positive for n =0 , as demanded by the right-hand side. Furthermore, as v(n)
cannot be a function of λ, the same must be true of ξ0 and ξ1.U p t o a p o s i t i v e a ﬃ n e
transformation of the preferences, one can therefore choose ξ0 =1and ξ1 = κ for some
κ>0 wlog. Extending the proof to the case η =1is straightforward. •
Hall (2008) has recently emphasized the importance of the Frisch demand for con-
sumption4 c = c(λ,w) and the Frisch labor supply n = n(λ,w), resulting from solving the
ﬁrst-order conditions (14) and (15). His work has focussed attention in particular on the
cross-elasticity between consumption and wages. That elasticity is generally not constant
for CFE preferences, but depends on κ and the steady state level of labor supply. The
next proposition provides the elasticities of c(λ,w)a n dn(λ,w), which will be needed in
(23). In particular, it follows that




for some value νcn, given as an expression involving balanced growth labor supply and
the CFE parameters. In equation (38) below, we shall show that νcn can be calculated
from additional balanced growth observations as well as ϕ and η alone, without reference
to κ. Put diﬀerently, balanced growth observations as well as the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply and η imply a value for the cross elasticity of Frisch consumption demand.
Conversely, a value for the latter has implication for some of the other variables: it is not
a “free parameter”. When we calibrate our model, we will provide the implications for
the cross-elasticity in table 8, which one may wish to compare to the value of 0.3 given by
Hall (2008). As a start, the proposition below or, more explicitly, equation (38) further
below implies, that the νcn and therefore the cross elasticity is positive iﬀ η>1( a n di s
zero, if η =1 ) .
The proposition more generally provides the equations necessary for calculating the
log-linearized dynamics of a model involving CFE preferences, or, alternatively, for solving
for the elasticity of the Frisch demand and Frisch supply. Given ϕ, η and νcn,a l lo t h e r
coeﬃcients are easily calculated.
4Hall (2008) writes the Frisch consumption demand and Frisch labor supply as c = C(λ,λw)a n dn =
N(λ,λw).15
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Note in particular, that the total elasticity of the Frisch consumption demand with
respect to deviations in the marginal value of wealth is not equal to the (negative of ) 1/η,
but additionally involves a term due to the change in labor supply in reaction to a change
in the marginal value of wealth. This is still true, when writing the Frisch consumption
demand as c = C(λ,λw) as in Hall (2008), and calculating the own elasticity per the
derivative with respect to the ﬁrst argument (i.e., holding λw constant). The proposition
implies that




















Therefore, this expression should be matched to the benchmark value of −0.5i nH a l l
(2008), rather than −1/η. We shall follow the literature, though, and use η = 2 as our
benchmark calibration, and will provide values for the elasticity above as a consequence,
once the model is fully calibrated. For example, the cross-Frisch-elasticity of 0.3a n d
a value of η = 2 implies an own-Frisch-elasticity of −0.65. Conversely, an own-Frisch-
elasticity of −0.5 and a cross-Frisch-elasticity of 0.3 implies η =3 .5. The proof of the
following proposition is available in a technical appendix.
Proposition 2 Suppose an agent has CFE preferences, where the preference parameter
κt is possibly stochastic. The log-linearization of the ﬁrst-order conditions (14) and (15)
around a balanced growth path at some date t is given by
ˆ λt = νccˆ ct + νcnˆ nt + νcκˆ κt
ˆ λt +ˆ wt = νncˆ ct + νnnˆ nt + νnκˆ κt
(22)

















ˆ λt + ϕ ˆ wt − ϕˆ κt
(23)16
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As an alternative, we also use the Cobb-Douglas preference speciﬁcation
U(ct,n t)=αlog(ct)+( 1− α)log(1− nt) (24)
as it is an important and widely used benchmark, see e.g. Cooley and Prescott (1995),
Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1995) or Uhlig (2004).
2.2 Equilibrium
In equilibrium the household chooses plans to maximize its utility, the ﬁrm solves its
maximization problem and the government sets policies that satisfy its budget constraint.
Inspection of the balanced growth relationships provides some useful insights for the issue
at hand. Some of these results are more generally useful for examining the impact of
wedges on balanced growth allocations as in Chari, Kehoe, and Mcgrattan (2007).





For CFE preferences, the balanced growth after-tax return on any asset is
¯ R = βψ−η, (25)17
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thereby tying β to observations on ¯ R and ψ as well as assumptions on η. We assume
throughout that parameters are such that
¯ R>1 (26)
Let k/y denote the balanced growth path value of the capital-output ratio kt−1/yt.I ti s
given by
k/y =

















This provides the familiar result that the balanced growth capital-output ratio and before-
tax wages only depend on policy through the capital income tax τk, decreasing monotoni-
cally, and depend on preference parameters only via ¯ R. It also implies that the tax receipts
from capital taxation and labor taxation relative to output are given by these tax rates
times a relative-to-output tax base which only depends on the capital income tax rate.
The level of these receipts therefore moves with the level of output or, equivalently for
constant capital income taxes, with the level of equilibrium labor.
It remains to solve for the level of equilibrium labor. Let c/y denote the balanced
growth path ratio ct/yt. With the CFE preference speciﬁcation and along the balanced


















depends on tax rates, the labor share and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
The feasibility constraint implies
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where
χ =1 − (ψ − 1+δ)k/y
γ =( ¯ m − ¯ g)k/y
−θ
1−θ
Substituting equation (32) into (30) therefore yields a one-dimensional nonlinear equation
in ¯ n, which can be solved numerically, given values for preference parameters, production
parameters, tax rates and the levels of ¯ b,¯ g and ¯ m.
The following proposition follows in a straightforward manner from examining these
equations, so we omit the proof.
Proposition 3 Assume that ¯ g ≥ ¯ m. Then, the solution for ¯ n is unique. It is decreasing
in τc or τn,w i t hτk,¯ b, ¯ g ﬁxed.
In particular, for constant τk and τc, there is a tradeoﬀ as τn increases: while equilibrium
labor and thus the labor tax base decrease, the fraction taxed from that tax base increases.
This tradeoﬀ gives rise to the Laﬀer curve.
Similarly, and in the special case ¯ g =¯ m, n falls with τk,c r e a t i n gt h es a m eL a ﬀ e r
curve tradeoﬀ for capital income taxation. With ¯ g>¯ m, but the unusual assumption that
ψ ≤ 1 − δ,¯ n can be shown to increase with τk. Generally, the tradeoﬀ for τk appears to
be hard to sign and we shall rely on numerical calculations instead.
For a consumption tax increase, labor and the consumption-output ratio falls, if ¯ m<¯ g,
because the reimbursement of the additional tax receipts as lump sum transfers lessen the
incentives to work. Consider a simpler one-period model without capital and the budget
constraint
(1 + τc)c =( 1− τn)wn + s (33)
If n and s remain constant, as τc is changed, then the consumption tax revenue will be
the share τc/(1+τc) of the constant right-hand-side income, and therefore increases with
τc. If the additional revenues are used to increase the transfers s and labor is chosen
optimally, the right hand side increases due to the increased transfers, but decreases due
to the lessened incentives to work. A Laﬀer curve may result, if labor supply is suﬃciently
elastic. We shall investigate this issue numerically.19
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Alternatively, consider ﬁxing ¯ s rather than ¯ g. Rewrite the budget constraint of the
household as









1 − (ψ − 1+δ)k/y − τn(1 − θ) − τk

θ − δ k/y

˜ γ =




can be calculated, given values for preference parameters, production parameters, tax rates
and the levels of ¯ b,¯ s and ¯ m.
To see the diﬀerence to the case of ﬁxing ¯ g, consider again the one-period model and
budget constraint (33). Maximizing growth-consistent preferences as in (13) subject to








If transfers s do not change with τc, then consumption taxes do not change labor supply.
Moreover, if transfers are zero, s = 0, labor taxes do not have an impact either. In both
cases, the substitution eﬀect and the income eﬀect exactly cancel just as they do for an
increase in total factor productivity. This insight generalizes to the model at hand, albeit
with some modiﬁcation.
Proposition 4 Fix ¯ s, and instead adapt ¯ g, as the tax revenues change across balanced
growth equilibria.
• There is no impact of consumption tax rates τc on equilibrium labor. As a conse-
quence, tax revenues always increase with increased consumption taxes.
• Suppose that
0=¯ b( ¯ R − ψ)+¯ s +¯ m (36)
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where the capital-income ratio depends on τk per (27). Equivalently, suppose that
all income from labor and capital is taxed at the rate τn without a deduction for
depreciation. Then there is no change of equilibrium labor.
Proof: For the claim regarding consumption taxes, note that the terms (1 + τc) for ˜ χ
and ˜ γ cancel with the corresponding term in α in equation (30). For the claim regarding
τk and τn, note that (37) together with (27) implies











Then either by rewriting the budget constraint with an income tax τn and calculating the







¯ R − 1+δ

as well as ˜ γ =0 , one obtains that the right-hand side in equation (30) and therefore also
¯ n remain constant, as tax rates are changed. •
This discussion highlights in particular the tax-unaﬀected income ¯ b( ¯ R−ψ)+¯ s+¯ m on
equilibrium labor. It also highlights an important reason for including the trade balance
in this analysis.
Given ¯ n, it is then straightforward to calculate total tax revenue as well as government
spending. Conversely, provided with an equilibrium value for ¯ n, one can use this equation
to ﬁnd the value of the preference parameter κ, supporting this equilibrium. A similar
calculation obtains for the Cobb-Douglas preference speciﬁcation.
While one could now use ¯ n and κ to calculate νcn for the coeﬃcients in proposition 2,












allowing the calculation of νcn from observing the consumption-output ratio, the parameter
α as well as ϕ and η, without reference to κ. Put diﬀerently, these values imply a value for
νcn and therefore for the cross-elasticity of the Frisch consumption demand with respect
to wages. The values implied by our calibration below are given in table 8.21
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3 Calibration and Parameterization
We calibrate the model to annual post-war data of the US and EU-14 economy. Mendoza,
Razin, and Tesar (1994), calculate average eﬀective tax rates from national product and
income accounts for the US. For this paper, we have followed their methodology to cal-
culate tax rates from 1995 to 2007 for the US and 14 of the EU-15 countries, excluding
Luxembourg for data availability reasons5. Appendix A provides some the details on the
required calculations and the data used, with further discussion of our approach and fur-
ther detail available in a technical appendix. Tables 13, 14 and 15 contain our calculated
panel of tax rates for labor, capital and consumption respectively.
All other data we use for the calibration comes from the AMECO database of the
European Commission. An overview of the calibration is provided in tables 1 and 2.
Variable US EU-14 Description Restriction
τn 28 41 Labor tax Data
τk 36 33 Capital tax Data
τc 5 17 Consumption tax Data
b/y 63 65 Gov. debt to GDP Data
g/y 18 23 Gov.cons+inv. to GDP Data
( s/y 8 15 Gov. transfer to GDP Implied )
ψ 2 2 growth rate Data
¯ R 4 4 real interest Data
m/y 4 -1 net imports Data
( b/y( ¯ R − ψ)+s/y + m/y 12 16 untaxed income implied )
Table 1: Baseline calibration, part 1
Most of the preference parameters are standard. We set parameters such that the
household chooses ¯ n =0 .25 in the US baseline calibration. This is consistent with evidence
on hours worked per person aged 15-64 for the US. Our data appendix A contains the
details.
5Carey and Rabesona (2002) also have calculated eﬀective averagetax rates on labor, capital and consumption
from 1975 to 2000 for the OECD countries. However, as their data set stops in 2000 and deviates for some items
from Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), we needed to provide our own calculations. The diﬀerences to Carey-
Rabesona in the overlapping part of the data set turn out to be small.22
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Var. US EU-14 Description Restriction
θ 0.38 0.38 Capital share on prod. Data
δ 0.07 0.07 Depr. rate of capital Data
η 2 2 inverse of IES benchmark
ϕ 1 1 Frisch elasticity benchmark
κ 3.46 3.46 weight of labor ¯ nus =0 .25
η 1 1 inverse of IES alternative
ϕ 3 3 Frisch elasticity alternative
κ 3.38 3.38 weight of labor ¯ nus =0 .25
α 0.319 0.321 Cons. weight in C-D ¯ nus =0 .25
Table 2: Baseline calibration, part 2
For the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, we follow a general consensus for it to
be close to 0.5 and therefore η = 2, as our benchmark choice. The speciﬁc value of the
Frisch labor supply elasticity is of central importance for the shape of the Laﬀer curve.
In the case of the alternative Cobb-Douglas preferences the Frisch elasticity is given by
1−¯ n
¯ n and equals 3 when ¯ n =0 .25. This value is in line with e.g. Kydland and Prescott
(1982), Cooley and Prescott (1995) and Prescott (2002, 2004), while a value close to 1 as
in Kimball and Shapiro (2003) may be closer to the current consensus view.
We therefore use η =2a n dϕ = 1 as the benchmark calibration for the CFE preferences,
and use η =1a n dϕ = 3 as alternative calibration and for comparison to a Cobb-Douglas
speciﬁcation. A more detailed discussion is provided in subsection B.2 of the technical
appendix.
3.1 EU-14 Model and individual EU countries
As a benchmark, we keep all other parameters as in the US model, i.e. the parameters
characterizing the growth rate as well as production and preferences. As a result, we
calculate the diﬀerences between the US and the EU-14 as arising solely from diﬀerences
in ﬁscal policy. This corresponds to Prescott (2002, 2004) who argues that diﬀerences in
hours worked between the US and Europe are due to diﬀerent level of labor income taxes.
In the subsection B.3 of the technical appendix, we provide a comparison of predicted
versus actual data for three key values: equilibrium labor, the capital-output ratio and
the consumption-output ratio. Discrepancies remain. While these are surely due to a
variety of reasons, in particular e.g. institutional diﬀerences in the implementation of23
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¯ τn ¯ τk ¯ τc ψ¯ b/¯ y ¯ m/¯ y ¯ g/¯ y ¯ s/¯ y
USA 28 36 5 63 4 18 8
EU-14 41 33 17 65 -1 23 15
GER 41 23 15 62 -3 21 15
FRA 46 35 18 60 -1 27 15
ITA 47 34 15 110 -2 21 19
GBR 28 46 16 44 2 21 13
AUT 50 24 20 65 -3 20 23
BEL 49 42 17 107 -4 24 21
DNK 47 51 35 50 -4 28 27
FIN 49 31 27 46 -8 24 22
GRE 41 16 15 100 10 20 15
IRL 27 21 26 43 -13 19 11
NET 44 29 19 58 -6 27 12
PRT 31 23 21 57 8 23 11
ESP 36 30 14 54 3 21 13
SWE 56 41 26 58 -7 30 21
Table 3: Country calibration
the welfare state, see e.g. Rogerson (2007) or Pissarides and Ngai (2008), variation in
parameters across countries may be one of the causes. For example, Blanchard (2004) as
well as Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005) argue that diﬀerences in preferences as well
as labor market regulations and union policies rather than diﬀerent ﬁscal policies are key
to understanding why hours worked have fallen in Europe compared to the US. To obtain
further insight and to provide a benchmark, we therefore vary parameters across countries
in order to obtain a perfect ﬁt to observations for these three key values. We then examine
these parameters whether they are in a “plausible range”, compared to the US calibration.
Finally, we investigate how far our results for the impacts of ﬁscal policy are aﬀected. It
will turn out that the eﬀect is modest, so that our conclusions may be viewed as fairly
robust.
More precisely, we use averages of the observations on xt/yt, kt−1/yt, nt, ct/yt, gt/yt,




= ψ − 1+δ (39)24
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for δ, (27) for θ, (30) for κ and aggregate feasiblity for a measurement error, which we
interpret as mismeasured government consumption (as this will not aﬀect the allocation
otherwise).
Table 4 provides the list of resulting parameters. Note that we shall need a larger value
for κ and thereby a greater preference for leisure in the EU-14 (in addition to the observed
higher labor tax rates) in order to account for the lower equilibrium labor in Europe. Some
of the implications are perhaps unconvential, however, and if so, this may indicate that
alternative reasons are the source for the cross-country variations. For example, while
Ireland is calculated to have one of the highest preferences for leisure, Greece appears to
have one of the lowest.
θδ κ ¯ gother/¯ y
USA 0.35 0.083 3.619 0.004
EU-14 0.38 0.070 4.595 -0.017
GER 0.37 0.067 5.179 -0.002
FRA 0.41 0.069 5.176 0.004
ITA 0.39 0.070 5.028 0.004
GBR 0.36 0.064 4.385 0.005
AUT 0.39 0.071 3.985 0.006
BEL 0.39 0.084 5.136 0.005
DNK 0.40 0.092 3.266 0.007
FIN 0.34 0.070 3.935 0.014
GRE 0.40 0.061 3.364 -0.005
IRL 0.36 0.086 5.662 0.006
NET 0.38 0.077 5.797 0.001
PRT 0.39 0.098 3.391 0.005
ESP 0.42 0.085 5.169 0.003
SWE 0.36 0.048 2.992 0.004
Table 4: Parameter Variations, given CFE preferences with ϕ =1 ,η =2
4R e s u l t s
As a ﬁrst check on the model, table 5 compares the measured and the model-implied sources
of tax revenue, relative to GDP. Due to the allocational distortions caused by the taxes,
there is no a priori reason that these numbers should coincide. While the models overstate
the taxes collected from labor income in the EU-14, they provide the correct numbers for25
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revenue from capital income taxation, indicating that the methodology of Mendoza-Razin-
Tesar is reasonable capable of delivering the appropriate tax burden on capital income,
despite the diﬃculties of taxing capital income in practice. Table 6 sheds further light on
this comparison: hours worked are overstated while total capital is understated for the EU-
14 by the model. With the parameter variation in table 4, the model will match the data
perfectly by construction, as indicated by the last line. This applies similarly to individual
countries as section B.3 in the technical appendix shows. Generally, the numbers are
roughly correct in terms of the order of magnitude, though, so we shall proceed with our
analysis.
Labor Tax Rev. Cap. Tax Rev. Cons. Tax Rev.
US EU-14 US EU-14 US EU-14
Data 14 19 98 31 0
Model
ϕ =1 ,η=2 17 25 76 38
ϕ =3 ,η=1 17 25 76 38
C-D 17 25 76 38
Varied params.,
ϕ =1 ,η=2 17 25 76 38
Table 5: Comparing measured and implied sources of tax revenue
Priv. Cons. Capital Hours Worked
US EU-14 US EU-14 US EU-14
Data 61 51 238 294 25 20
Model
ϕ =1 ,η=2 60 50 286 294 25 23
ϕ =3 ,η=1 60 50 286 294 25 23
C-D 60 50 286 294 25 23
Varied params.,
ϕ =1 ,η=2 61 51 238 294 25 20
Table 6: Comparing measured and calculated key macroeconomic aggregates: consumption,
capital (in % of GDP) and hours worked (in % total time)26
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4.1 Labor Tax Laﬀer Curves
The Laﬀer curve for labor income taxation in the US is shown in ﬁgure 1. Note that
the CFE and Cobb-Douglas preferences coincide closely, if the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution 1/η and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϕ are the same at the bench-
mark steady state. Therefore, CFE preferences are close enough to the Cobb-Douglas
speciﬁcation, if η = 1, and provide a growth-consistent generalization, if η  =1 .
For marginal rather than dramatic tax changes, the slope of the Laﬀer curve near the
current data calibration is of interest. The slope is related to the degree of self-ﬁnancing
of a tax cut, deﬁned as the ratio of additional tax revenues due to general equilibrium
incentive eﬀects and the lost tax revenues at constant economic choices. More formally
and precisely, we calculate the degree of self-ﬁnancing of a labor tax cut per








Tt(τn +  ,τk) − Tt(τn −  ,τk)
2 
where T(τn,τ k,τ c;g,b) is the function of tax revenues across balanced growth equilbria
for diﬀerent tax rates, and constant paths for government spending g and debt b.T h i s
self-ﬁnancing rate is a constant along the balanced growth path, i.e. does not depend on
t. Likewise, we calculate the degree of self-ﬁnancing of a capital tax cut.
We calculate these self-ﬁnancing rates numerically as indicated by the second expres-
sion, with   set to 0.01 ( and tax rates expressed as fractions). If there were no endogenous
change of the allocation due to a tax change, the loss in tax revenue due to a one per-
centage point reduction in the tax rate would be wt¯ n, and the self-ﬁnancing rate would
calculate to 0. At the peak of the Laﬀer curve, the tax revenue would not change at all,
and the self-ﬁnancing rate would be 100%. Indeed, the self-ﬁnancing rate would become
larger than 100% beyond the peak of the Laﬀer curve.
For labor taxes, table 7 provides results for the self-ﬁnancing rate as well as for the
location of the peak of the Laﬀer curve for our benchmark calibration of the CFE preference
parameters, as well as a sensitivity analysis. Figure 3 likewise shows the sensitivity of the
Laﬀer curve to variations in ϕ and η. The peak of the Laﬀer curve shifts up and to the
right, as η and ϕ are decreased. The dependence on η arises due to the nonseparability
of preferences in consumption and leisure. Capital adjusts as labor adjusts across the
balanced growth paths.27
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1174
April 2010
The table provides results for the US as well as the EU-14: there is considerably less
scope for additional ﬁnancing of government revenue in Europe from raising labor taxes.
For our preferred benchmark calibration with a Frisch elasticity of 1 and an intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of 0.5, we ﬁnd that the US and the EU-14 are located on the left
side of their Laﬀer curves, but while the US can increase tax revenues by 30% by raising
labor taxes, the EU-14 can raise only an additional 8%.
To gain further insight, ﬁgure 2 compares the US and the EU Laﬀer curve for our
benchmark calibration of ϕ =1a n dη = 2, benchmarking both Laﬀer curves to 100%
at the US labor tax rate. As the CFE parameters are changed, so are the cross-Frisch
elasticities and own-Frisch elasticities of consumption: the values are provided in table 8.
Parameter % self-ﬁn. max. τn max. add. tax rev.
Region: US EU-14 US EU-14 US EU-14
ϕ =1 ,η=2: 32 54 63 62 30 8
ϕ =3 ,η=1: 38 65 57 56 21 4
ϕ =3 ,η=2: 49 78 52 51 14 2
ϕ =1 ,η=2: 32 54 63 62 30 8
ϕ =0 .5,η=2: 21 37 72 71 47 17
ϕ =1 ,η=2: 32 54 63 62 30 8
ϕ =1 ,η=1: 27 47 65 65 35 10
ϕ =1 ,η=0 .5: 20 37 69 68 43 15
Table 7: Labor Tax Laﬀer curves: degree of self-ﬁnancing, maximal tax rate, maximal additional
tax revenues. Shown are results for the US and the EU-14, and the sensitivity of the results to
changes in the CFE preference parameters.
Table 9 as well as ﬁgure 4 provide insight into the degree of self-ﬁnancing as well as
the location of the Laﬀer curve peak for individual countries, for both the case of keeping
the parameters the same across all countries as well as varying them according to table 4.
It matters for the thought experiment here, that the additional tax revenues are spent
on transfers, and not on other government spending. For the latter, the substitution eﬀect
is mitigated by an income eﬀect on labor: as a result the Laﬀer curve becomes steeper
with a peak to the right and above the peak coming from a “labor tax for transfer” Laﬀer
curve, see ﬁgure 5.
This matters even more for consumption taxes. As we have shown above, the consump-
tion tax revenue increase with increased consumption taxes, in the case the additional28
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Parameter cross-Frisch-elast. own-Frisch-elast.
Region: US EU-14 US EU-14
ϕ =1 ,η=2: 0.4 0.3 -0.7 -0.7
ϕ =3 ,η=1: -0.0 -0.0 -1.0 -1.0
ϕ =3 ,η=2: 1.1 0.9 -1.0 -1.0
ϕ =1 ,η=2: 0.4 0.3 -0.7 -0.7
ϕ =0 .5,η=2: 0.2 0.2 -0.6 -0.6
ϕ =1 ,η=2: 0.4 0.3 -0.7 -0.7
ϕ =1 ,η=1: -0.0 -0.0 -1.0 -1.0
ϕ =1 ,η=0 .5: -0.7 -0.6 -2.7 -2.6
Table 8: Cross-Frisch elasticities of consumption wrt wages and own-Frisch elasticities of con-
sumption wrt to the Lagrange multiplier on wealth.
revenues are used for additional government spending, while there can be a Laﬀer curve,
in case the additional revenues are used for transfers. Figure 7 shows the consumption
Laﬀer curve once for our benchmark parameterization and once for an extreme version of
an inﬁnite Frisch elasticity, both for the US and for the EU-14 and benchmarking both
Laﬀer curves to 100% at the US consumption tax rate. The ﬁgure shows the Laﬀer curve in
consumption taxes to be increasing throughout, and the potential for additional revenues
to be dramatic. Whether it is possible in practice to raise consumption taxes amounting
to, say, 80% of the sales price (as would be the case for τc = 4) is a diﬀerent matter,
though.
4.2 Capital Tax Laﬀer Curves
Figure 6 shows the Laﬀer curve for capital income taxation in the US. Benchmark results, a
comparison to the EU as well as the sensitivity analysis with respect to the CFE parameters
are given in table 10 as well as the right column of ﬁgure 3 and in ﬁgure 8, benchmarking
both Laﬀer curves to 100% at the US capital tax rate. For our preferred benchmark
calibration with a Frisch elasticity of 1 and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
0.5, we ﬁnd that the US and the EU-14 are located on the left side of their Laﬀer curves,
but the scope for raising tax revenues by raising capital income taxes are small: they are
bound by 6% in the US and by 1% in the EU-14.
The cross-country comparison is in the right column of ﬁgure 4 and in table 11. Sev-
eral countries, e.g. Denmark and Sweden, show a negative self-ﬁnancing fraction: these29
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1174
April 2010
% self-ﬁn. max. τn max. add. tax rev.
Parameters: same varied same varied same varied
USA 32 30 63 64 30 33
EU-14 54 55 62 61 87
GER 50 51 64 64 10 10
FRA 62 62 63 63 55
ITA 63 62 62 62 44
GBR 42 42 59 59 17 17
AUT 71 70 61 62 22
BEL 69 68 61 62 33
DNK 83 79 55 57 11
FIN 70 68 62 63 33
GRE 54 55 60 59 77
IRL 35 34 68 69 30 32
NET 53 53 67 67 99
PRT 45 44 59 60 14 15
ESP 46 46 62 62 13 13
SWE 83 86 63 61 10
Table 9: Labor Tax Laﬀer curves across countries, for ϕ =1 ,η = 2: degree of self-ﬁnancing,
maximal tax rate, maximal additional tax revenues. Shown are results for keeping the same
parameters for all countries and for varying the parameters so as to obtain observed labor,
capital-output ratio, investment-output ratio and aggregate feasibility.
countries are on the “slippery side” of the Laﬀer curve and can actually improve their
budgetary situation by cutting capital taxes, according to our calculations.
As one can see, the additional revenues that can be obtained from an increased capital
income taxation are small, once the economy has converged to the new balanced growth
path. The transition matters substantially for capital income taxation, obviously, but the
dynamics here is similar to the much-studied dynamics of capital in closed-economy or
open-economy real business cycles models due to a deviation of the capital stock from its
steady state value. Generally, the speed of convergence will e.g. depend on the openness of
the country and costs of adjustments. We do not have much to contribute to that debate
here, but it is useful to keep the potentially long transitional dynamics in mind before
drawing policy conclusions from the numbers presented here.
Note that the level of taxation which delivers maximum tax revenues is not in general
a policy that maximises welfare. In particular, the higher the level of distortionary taxes
in the model, the higher are the eﬃciency losses associated with taxation. If government30
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Parameter % self-ﬁn. max. τk max. add. tax rev.
Region: US EU-14 US EU-14 US EU-14
ϕ =1 ,η=2: 51 79 63 48 61
ϕ =3 ,η=1: 55 82 62 46 51
ϕ =3 ,η=2: 60 87 60 44 40
ϕ =1 ,η=2: 51 79 63 48 61
ϕ =0 .5,η=2: 45 73 64 50 71
ϕ =1 ,η=2: 51 79 63 48 61
ϕ =1 ,η=1: 48 77 64 49 61
ϕ =1 ,η=0 .5: 45 73 64 50 71
Table 10: Capital Tax Laﬀer curves: degree of self-ﬁnancing, maximal tax rate, maximal ad-
ditional tax revenues. Shown are results for the US and the EU-14, and the sensitivity of the
results to changes in the CFE preference parameters.
consumption is non-valued by households or constant, welfare losses increase with the
level of taxation in our model.6 On the other hand, if government consumption is valued
by households and adjusts endogenously with the level of revenues, higher taxes might
increase welfare, depending on the degree of valuation of course. However, an explicit
welfare analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
It is instructive to investigate, why the capital Laﬀer curve is so ﬂat e.g. in Europe.
Figure 9 shows a decomposition of the overall Laﬀer curve into its pieces: the reaction of
the three tax bases and the resulting tax receipts. The labor tax base is falling throughout:
as the incentives to accumulate capital are deteriorating, less capital is provided along the
balanced growth equilibrium, and therefore wages fall. The capital tax revenue keeps rising
quite far, though: indeed, even the capital tax base keeps rising. An important lesson to
take away is therefore this: if one is interested in examining the revenue consequences of
increased capital taxation, it is actually the consequence for labor tax revenues which is
the “ﬁrst-order” item to watch. This decomposition and insight shows the importance of
keeping the general equilibrium repercussions in mind when changing taxes.
Table 12 summarizes the range of results of our sensitivity analysis both for labor taxes
as well as capital taxes for the US and the EU-14.
Furthermore, one may be interested in the combined budgetary eﬀect of changing labor
and capital income taxation. This gets closer to the literature of Ramsey optimal taxation,
6In an alternative model framework, Braun and Uhlig (2006) demonstrate that increasing taxes and wasting
the resulting tax revenues may even improve welfare.31
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% self-ﬁn. max. τk max. add. tax rev.
Parameters: same varied same varied same varied
USA 51 46 63 68 67
EU-14 79 80 48 47 11
GER 70 71 49 49 22
FRA 88 89 44 43 00
ITA 88 88 42 42 00
GBR 73 73 57 58 11
AUT 88 88 35 35 00
BEL 103 98 40 43 00
DNK 137 126 30 35 11
FIN 92 90 38 40 00
GRE 73 74 42 39 22
IRL 50 48 62 67 88
NET 75 74 50 52 11
PRT 65 61 50 55 33
ESP 68 67 52 53 22
SWE 109 116 33 29 00
Table 11: Capital Tax Laﬀer curves across countries, for ϕ =1 ,η= 2: degree of self-ﬁnancing,
maximal tax rate, maximal additional tax revenues. Shown are results for keeping the same
parameters for all countries and for varying the parameters so as to obtain observed labor,
capital-output ratio, investment-output ratio and aggregate feasibility.
to which this paper does not seek to make a contribution. But ﬁgure 10, providing the
contour lines of a “Laﬀer hill”, nonetheless may provide some useful insights. As one
compares balanced growth paths, it turns out that revenue is maximized when raising
labor taxes but lowering capital taxes: the peak of the hill is in the lower right hand side
corner of that ﬁgure.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the following question: how does the behavior of households and ﬁrms
in the US compared to the EU-14 adjust if ﬁscal policy changes taxes? The Laﬀer curve
provides us with a framework to think about the incentive eﬀects of tax cuts. Therefore,
the goal of this paper is to examine the shape of the Laﬀer curve quantitatively in a simple
neoclassical growth model calibrated to the US as well as to the EU-14 economy. We show
that there exist robust steady state Laﬀer curves for labor taxes as well as capital taxes.32
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US EU
Potential additional tax revenues (in % ):
labor taxes 14% .. 47% 2% .. 17%
capital taxes 4% .. 7% 0% .. 1%
Maximizing tax rate (in %) :
labor taxes 52% .. 72% 51% .. 71%
capital taxes 60% .. 64% 44% .. 50%
Percent self-ﬁnancing of a tax cut (in % ):
labor taxes 20% .. 49% 37% .. 78%
capital taxes 45% .. 60% 73% .. 87%
Table 12: The range of results for the parameter variations considered.
According to the model the US and the EU-14 area are located on the left side of their
Laﬀer curves. However the EU-14 countries are much closer to the slippery slopes than the
US. More precisely, we ﬁnd that the US can increase tax revenues by 30% by raising labor
taxes but only 6% by raising capital income taxes, while the same numbers for EU-14 are
8% and 1% respectively. An overview of the sensitivity of these results to alternative values
for the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and the intertemporal elasticity of substitition has
been provided in table 12.
In addition, our results indicate that tax cuts in the EU-14 area are self-ﬁnancing to
a much higher degree compared to the US. We ﬁnd that for the US model 32% of a labor
tax cut and 51% of a capital tax cut are self-ﬁnancing in the steady state. In the EU-14
economy 54% of a labor tax cut and 79% of a capital tax cut are self-ﬁnancing.
We therefore conclude that there rarely is a free lunch due to tax cuts. However, a
substantial fraction of the lunch will be paid for by the eﬃciency gains in the economy
due to tax cuts.
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Figure 1: The US Laﬀer Curve for Labor Taxes
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Figure 2: Comparing the US and the EU Labor Laﬀer Curve
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Figure 3: Sensitivity to ϕ and η
Sensitivity to ϕ Sensitivity to η
Labor Tax Laﬀer Curves:
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Sensitivity of the Labor Tax Laffer Curve: USA   (CFE utility; FRISCH=1)
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Capital Tax Laﬀer Curves:
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Figure 4: Distances to the Laﬀer Peak across countries
Same Parameters Varied Parameters
Labor Tax Laﬀer Curves:
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Capital Tax Laﬀer Curves:
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Figure 5: Labor Taxes Laﬀer Curve: Spending versus Transfers
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Figure 6: The US Laﬀer Curve for Capital Taxes
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Figure 7: Comparing the US and the EU Consumption Laﬀer Curve
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Figure 8: Comparing the US and the EU Capital Laﬀer Curve
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Figure 9: Decomposing Capital Taxes: EU 14
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Appendix
A EU-14 Tax Rates and GDP Ratios
In order to obtain EU-14 tax rates and GDP ratios we proceed as follows. E.g., EU-14







where j denotes each individual EU-14 country. Rewriting equation (40) yields the con-














The numerator of equation (41) consists of consumption tax revenues of each individual
country j whereas the denominator consists of consumption tax revenues divided by the













The methodology of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) allows to calculate implicit
individual country consumption tax revenues so that we can easily calculate the EU-14
consumption tax rate τc
EU−14,t. Likewise, applying the same procedure we calculate EU-14
labor and capital tax rates. Taking averages over time yields the tax rates we report in
table 1.
In order to calculate EU-14 GDP ratios we proceed as follows. E.g., the GDP weighted
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where bj and yj are individual country government debt and GDP. Likewise, we apply the
same procedure for the EU-14 transfer to GDP ratio. Taking averages over time yields
the numbers used for the calibration of the model.
Tables 13, 14 and 15 contain our calculated panel of tax rates for labor, capital and
consumption respectively.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
USA 27.6 28.2 28.6 28.9 29.2 29.6 29.4 27.2 26.3 26.1 27.4 27.9 28.4
EU-14 42.3 42.2 42.0 41.3 41.5 40.5 40.2 39.7 40.1 40.1 40.5 41.0 41.3
GER 42.0 40.9 41.4 41.9 41.7 41.4 41.7 40.8 40.6 40.0 40.2 41.2 41.5
FRA 46.2 46.8 46.6 45.4 45.8 45.3 44.7 44.4 45.0 44.7 46.0 45.9 45.7
ITA 46.4 48.5 49.7 45.9 46.3 45.7 45.5 45.6 45.9 46.2 46.1 46.2 47.8
GBR 26.8 26.1 25.7 26.9 27.4 27.8 27.7 27.2 27.7 28.8 29.3 29.8 30.4
AUT 47.5 48.7 50.0 50.1 50.3 49.4 50.8 50.7 50.7 50.8 50.3 50.3 50.3
BEL 48.1 48.0 48.6 49.0 48.4 48.3 48.3 49.0 49.3 49.6 49.5 48.5 48.8
DNK 46.4 46.8 47.4 46.6 48.6 48.8 48.7 47.5 47.7 46.6 47.0 46.7 47.9
FIN 51.9 52.6 50.4 49.9 48.9 49.4 48.6 48.0 46.6 45.8 46.6 47.1 47.2
GRE NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 40.2 39.8 41.0 42.3 40.5 40.3 40.0 40.3
IRL NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 25.4 25.6 26.9 27.0 27.4 28.5
NET 49.4 46.4 46.8 42.3 43.6 43.6 40.4 40.7 41.0 41.8 42.8 45.8 45.0
PRT 29.4 29.8 30.1 29.9 30.1 30.8 31.2 31.4 32.0 31.9 32.5 32.7 34.4
ESP NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 34.1 34.8 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.9 36.6 37.4
SWE 52.9 54.6 56.3 58.1 60.7 57.2 55.2 53.6 55.2 55.9 56.0 56.5 54.6
Table 13: Labor income taxes in percent across countries and time45
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
USA 37.8 37.3 37.1 37.5 37.3 38.3 36.1 32.9 33.6 34.0 36.4 36.4 38.2
EU-14 29.6 30.9 32.6 33.3 35.2 34.7 33.7 31.7 30.6 31.0 32.7 34.8 34.4
GER 23.1 22.8 22.8 23.9 25.9 27.0 21.6 21.4 22.0 21.6 22.3 24.4 24.8
FRA 27.9 30.3 32.2 34.9 37.5 36.9 38.0 36.0 34.6 36.6 37.1 40.1 39.2
ITA 32.7 34.0 36.2 32.3 35.1 32.2 33.7 32.9 31.7 31.8 32.8 37.4 39.1
GBR 40.3 39.9 42.8 45.9 47.4 52.1 52.5 45.8 42.4 42.5 46.9 49.2 45.1
AUT 20.4 23.5 25.6 25.6 24.0 23.6 28.7 24.4 24.0 23.6 22.9 22.3 23.2
BEL 38.1 40.4 41.9 44.9 44.9 44.3 46.6 45.3 42.8 41.4 40.8 40.5 39.6
DNK 43.3 44.6 44.9 52.5 47.8 46.2 49.5 50.7 51.5 52.3 57.3 58.3 59.3
FIN 28.2 32.0 32.4 33.3 33.3 39.2 31.4 31.1 29.3 29.5 30.1 28.4 29.3
GRE NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 20.1 17.1 16.7 15.0 14.8 15.5 14.5 14.5
IRL NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 17.5 19.0 20.3 21.0 24.2 22.5
NET 27.6 30.4 30.3 30.9 31.4 30.3 31.3 29.5 26.9 27.4 30.8 28.2 26.1
PRT 18.9 20.6 21.2 21.0 23.4 26.1 24.4 25.2 23.4 23.2 24.0 25.6 27.6
ESP NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 25.9 24.8 26.6 27.1 29.1 32.6 35.0 36.2
SWE 30.1 36.2 39.0 39.8 41.5 49.8 47.2 40.4 40.3 40.7 44.0 40.8 41.8
Table 14: Capital income taxes in percent across countries and time
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
USA 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.2
EU-14 17.0 17.1 17.1 17.4 17.7 17.5 17.0 16.9 16.8 16.7 16.6 16.7 16.9
GER 15.4 15.3 15.0 15.2 15.9 16.0 15.5 15.5 15.6 15.1 14.9 15.2 16.6
FRA 18.5 19.4 19.5 19.5 19.7 18.7 18.0 17.9 17.5 17.5 17.6 17.4 17.2
ITA 15.4 14.4 14.2 15.1 14.7 15.6 14.9 14.6 14.1 13.7 13.7 14.3 14.0
GBR 16.9 17.2 17.2 17.1 17.1 16.7 16.1 15.9 16.0 15.9 15.4 15.1 14.9
AUT 18.6 19.1 20.2 20.4 20.9 19.7 19.4 19.9 19.4 19.5 19.4 18.8 19.2
BEL 16.4 16.7 17.1 17.0 18.0 17.7 16.6 17.0 16.8 17.5 17.8 18.0 18.2
DNK 32.4 33.9 34.2 35.4 36.4 35.7 35.8 35.7 35.0 34.8 34.9 35.2 34.3
FIN 26.5 26.5 29.0 28.7 29.0 28.1 26.8 26.9 27.3 26.3 26.2 25.8 25.0
GRE 15.8 16.0 16.5 15.7 16.2 15.2 15.8 15.7 14.9 14.5 14.2 15.1 14.9
IRL 24.2 24.6 25.1 26.3 26.6 27.3 24.2 25.1 24.9 26.1 26.6 27.1 25.6
NET 17.9 18.4 18.5 18.7 19.5 19.3 19.9 19.1 19.2 19.8 20.8 20.2 20.5
PRT 19.8 20.4 20.1 21.3 21.4 20.3 20.4 21.1 20.9 20.5 21.3 21.6 21.5
ESP 12.8 13.1 13.5 14.3 15.0 15.0 14.5 14.6 15.0 14.9 15.1 15.2 14.7
SWE 26.8 25.3 25.1 25.5 25.1 24.8 25.2 25.1 25.3 25.4 25.8 26.1 26.5
Table 15: Consumption taxes in percent across countries and time46
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
B Additions to the main text
B.1 A proof



















For the explicit expressions, calculate. For the Frisch demand and supply, use matrix
inversion for (22) together with the explicit expressions for the coeﬃcients, and calculate.
•
B.2 Details on the Calibration Choices
Empirical estimates of the intertemporal elasticity vary considerably. Hall (1988) estimates
it to be close to zero. Recently, Gruber (2006) provides an excellent survey on estimates
in the literature. Further, he estimates the intertemporal elasticity to be two. Cooley and
Prescott (1995) and King and Rebelo (1999) use an intertemporal elasticity equal to one.
The general current consensus seems to be that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
is closer to 0.5, which we shall use for our baseline calibration, but also investigating a
value equal to unity as an alternative, and impose it for the Cobb-Douglas preference
speciﬁcation.
There is a large literature that estimates the Frisch labor supply elasticity from micro
data. Domeij and Floden (2006) argue that labor supply elasticity estimates are likely to47
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be biased downwards by up to 50 percent. However, the authors survey the existing micro
Frisch labor supply elasticity estimates and conclude that many estimates range between
0 and 0.5. Further, Kniesner and Ziliak (2005) estimate a Frisch labor supply elasticity of
0.5 while and Kimball and Shapiro (2003) obtain a Frisch elasticity close to 1. Hence, this
literature suggests an elasticity in the range of 0 to 1 instead of a value of 3 as suggested
by Prescott (2006).
In the most closely related public-ﬁnance-in-macro literature, e.g. House and Shapiro
(2006), a value of 1 is often used. We shall follow that choice as our benchmark calibration,
and regard a value of 3 as the alternative speciﬁcation.
We therefore use η =2a n dϕ = 1 as the benchmark calibration for the CFE preferences,
and use η =1a n dϕ = 3 as alternative calibration and for comparison to a Cobb-Douglas
speciﬁcation for preferences with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to unity
and imposing ¯ n =0 .25, implying a Frisch elasticity of 3.
B.3 Comparing the model to the data
Figure 11 shows the match between model prediction and data for equilibrium labor as well
as for the capital-output ratio: the discrepancies get resolved by construction in the right-
hand column, with the varied parameters as in table 4. Figure 12 shows the implications
for tax revenues relative to output: the predictions do not move much with the variation
in the parameters. Generally, though, the model overpredicts the amount of labor tax
revenues and underpredicts the amount of capital tax revenues collected, compared to the
data.48
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Figure 11: Model-Data Comparison Without and with Varying the Parameters
Same parameters Varied parameters




































Actual vs predicted: hours (CFE utility, η=2; Frisch=1)






































Actual vs predicted: hours (CFE utility, η=2; Frisch=1)





































Actual vs predicted: capital output ratio





































Actual vs predicted: capital output ratio



































Actual vs predicted: consumption to output



































Actual vs predicted: consumption to output49
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Figure 12: Model-Data Comparison Without and with Varying the Parameters
Same parameters Varied parameters
































Actual vs predicted: labor tax revenues to output

































Actual vs predicted: labor tax revenues to output







































Actual vs predicted: capital tax revenues to output









































































Actual vs predicted: consumption tax revenues to output




































Actual vs predicted: consumption tax revenues to output50
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C Data Discussion and Overview
Figure 13 shows the resulting time series for taxes as well as the macroeconomic series we
have used. For the calibration, we equate the values on the balanced growth path with
the averages of these time series over the period from 1995 to 2007.
Using this methodology necessarily fails to capture fully the detailed nuances and
features of the tax law and the inherent incentives. Nonetheless, several arguments may
be made for why we use eﬀective average tax rates instead of marginal tax rates for the
calibration of the model. First, we are not aware of a comparable and coherent empirical
methodology that could be used to calculate marginal labor, capital and consumption tax
rates for the US and 15 European countries for a time span of, say, the last 12 years. By
contrast, our calculations along with Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) and Carey and
Rabesona (2002) calculate eﬀective average tax rates for labor, capital and consumption
for our countries of interest. There is some data available from the NBER for marginal
tax rates on the federal and state level: however and at least for the US, the diﬀerence
between marginal and average tax rates are modest.
Second, if any we probably make an error on side of caution since eﬀective average tax
rates can be seen as as representing a lower bound of statutory marginal tax rates. Third,
marginal tax rates diﬀer all across income scales. In order to properly account for this, a
heterogenous agent economy is needed. This might be a useful next step but may fog up
key issues analyzed in this paper initially. Fourth, statutory marginal tax rates are often
diﬀerent from realized marginal tax rates due to a variety of tax deductions etc. So that
potentially, the eﬀective tax rates computed and used here may reﬂect realized marginal
tax rates more accurately than statutory marginal tax rates in legal tax codes. Fifth,
using eﬀective tax rates following the methodology of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994)
facilitates comparison to previous studies that also use these tax rates as e.g. Mendoza
and Tesar (1998) and many others. Nonetheless, a further analysis taking these points
into account in detail is a useful next step on the research agenda.51
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Figure 13: Data used for Calibration of the Baseline Models
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D Data Details
This appendix describes the data used in the main part of the paper. We use annual data
from 1995 to 2007 for the following countries: USA, Germany (GER), France (FRA), Italy
(ITA), United Kingdom (UK), Austria (AUT), Belgium (B), Denmark (DEN), Finland
(FIN), Greece (GRE), Ireland (IRL), Netherlands (NET), Portugal (PRT), Spain (ESP)
and Sweden (SWE). Data from the sources listed below was downloaded in fall 2008.
D.1 Databases used
AMECO: Database of the European Commission available at:
http : //ec.europa.eu/economy finance/db indicators/db indicators8646 en.htm.
OECD: Databases for annual national accounts, labor force statistics and revenue statis-
tics of the OECD. Available at:
http : //stats.oecd.org/wbosdos/Default.aspx?usercontext = sourceoecd
GGDC: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board total
economy database, January 2008 available at: http : //www.ggdc.net or
http : //www.conference − board.org/economics/downloads/TED08I.xls
NIPA: National income and product accounts provided by the BEA. Available at: www.bea.gov.
D.2 Macro Data
D.2.1 Raw Data
All data below except for population and hours are in $, EUR or local currency for Den-
mark, Sweden and United Kingdom:
Nominal GDP: Gross domestic product at current market prices (AMECO, UVGD).
Nominal government consumption: Final consumption expenditure of general gov-
ernment at current prices (AMECO, UCTG).53
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Nominal total government expenditures: Total current expenditure: general gov-
ernment; ESA 1995 (AMECO, UUCG).
Nominal total government expenditures excluding interest payments: Total cur-
rent expenditure excluding interest - general government - ESA 1995 (AMECO, UUCGI).
Nominal government debt: General government consolidated gross debt - Excessive
deﬁcit procedure (based on ESA 1995) and former deﬁnition (linked series) (AMECO,
UDGGL).
Nominal total private consumption: Private ﬁnal consumption expenditure at current
prices (AMECO, UCPH).
Nominal total private investment: Gross ﬁxed capital formation at current prices:
private sector (AMECO, UIGP).
Real capital stock: Net capital stock at constant (2000) prices; total economy (AMECO,
OKND).
Real GDP: Gross domestic product at constant (2000) market prices (AMECO, OVGD).
Nominal exchange rate: ECU-EUR exchange rates - Units of national currency per
EUR/ECU (AMECO, XNE).
Net exports: Net exports of goods and services at current prices (National accounts)
(AMECO, UBGS).
Nominal government investment: Gross ﬁxed capital formation at current prices:
general government; ESA 1995 (AMECO, UIGG0).
Total Hours Worked: Total annual hours worked (GGDC).
Nominal durable consumption: Final consumption expenditure of households, P311:
durable goods, old breakdown, national currency, current prices, national accounts database
(OECD).
Population: Population 15-64, labor force statistics (OECD).
D.2.2 Data Calculations
Consumption and Investment. Total consumption in the data consists of non-durable con-
sumption of goods and services and and durable consumption. In the model consumption
is meant to be non-durable consumption only. In order to align the data with the model
we therefore substract durable consumption from total consumption and add it to pri-
vate investment in the data. Unfortunately, durable consumption data is available only54
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for FRA, IRE, NET, UK and US. The sample covered is somewhat diﬀerent across these
countries. However, in order to proxy durable consumption data for the remaining coun-
tries we proceed as follows. We compute the ratio of durable consumption and total private
consumption per year for the available country data. Interestingly, the shares for FRA,
IRE and NET are twice as large as those for the UK and the US. We then calculate the
total average share per year of the average UK/US and average FRA/IRE/NET shares.
For the countries where there is no durable consumption data this total average share per
year is applied to the annual total private consumption data in order to obtain a measure
of durable consumption.
Government Interest Payments. Government interest payments are calculated as the
diﬀerence between total government expenditures and total government expenditures ex-
cluding interest payments.
Implied Government Transfers and Tax-Unaﬀected Income. Government transfers that
are consistent with the model are calculated by substracting government consumption,
government interest payments and government investment from total government expen-
ditures in the data.
Similarly, tax-unaﬀected income consistent with the model is calculated by adding
government interest payments, government transfers and net imports in the data.
GDP Growth. Per capita GDP growth is calculated by dividing real GDP by population
and then calculating annual percentage changes.
Hours Worked. In order to obtain a measure of annual hours worked per person we
divide total annual hours by population. Furthermore, we assume 14.55 hours per day to
be allocated between leisure and work in the US and EU-14 similar to Ragan (2005) who
assumes 14 hours. We obtain a normalized average US hours per person measure of 0.25
as used in the main part of the paper.
Ratios of Variables to GDP. Based on the above data we calculate the GDP ratios
for the countries. We also require the weighted EU-14 GDP ratios which are calculated
according to the description in appendix A.1.
Note that variables that describe the ﬁscal sector such as e.g. government debt etc.
are only available in nominal terms. Consistent with the model, we divide these nominal
variables by nominal GDP i.e. deﬂate nominal variables with the GDP deﬂator. We also55
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deﬂate all other nominal variables with the GDP deﬂator. Since we are interested in GDP
ratios only we do not need to divide the time series by population since the division would
appear in the numerator as well as in the denominator and therefore would cancel out.
D.3 Tax Rates Data
We calculate eﬀective tax rates on labor income, capital income and consumption following
the methodology of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) and used in Mendoza, Razin and
Tesar (1997).
D.3.1 Raw Data
All data below are nominal in $, EUR or local currency for Denmark, Sweden and United
Kingdom:
5110: General taxes, revenue statistics (OECD).
5121: Excise taxes, revenue statistics (OECD).
3000: Payroll taxes, revenue statistics (OECD).
4000: Property taxes, revenue statistics (OECD).
1000: Income, proﬁt and capital gains taxes, revenue statistics (OECD).
2000: Social security contributions, revenue statistics (OECD).
2200: Social security contributions of employers, revenue statistics (OECD).
1100: Income, proﬁt and capital gains taxes of individuals, revenue statistics (OECD).
1200: Income, proﬁt and capital gains taxes of corporations, revenue statistics (OECD).
4100: Recurrent taxes on immovable property, revenue statistics (OECD).
4400: Taxes on ﬁnancial and capital transactions, revenue statistics (OECD).
GW: Compensation of employees: general government - ESA 1995 (AMECO, UWCG).
OS: Net operating surplus: total economy (AMECO, UOND). This is net operating sur-
plus plus net mixed income or equivalently the gross operating surplus minus consumption
of ﬁxed capital. For the USA OS is not available in AMECO. We obtained OS from NIPA
table 11000 line 11.56
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1174
April 2010
W: Gross wages and salaries: households and NPISH (AMECO, UWSH). For the USA
W is not available in AMECO. We obtained W from NIPA table 11000 line 4.
PEI: Net property income: households and NPISH (AMECO, UYNH). Note that in con-
trast to the data available to Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) the present PEI data
does not contain entrepreneurial income of households anymore. Instead household en-
trepreneurial income is contained in OSPUE deﬁned below. For the USA PEI is not
available in AMECO. We calculate this from OECD property income received (SS14 S15:
Households and non-proﬁt institutions serving households, SD4R: Property income; re-
ceived, national accounts) minus property income paid (SS14 S15: Households and non-
proﬁt institutions serving households, SD4P: Property income; paid, national accounts).
OSPUE: Gross operating surplus and mixed income: households and NPISH (AMECO,
UOGH). OSPUE in Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) is operating surplus of private un-
incorporated enterprises. This data is called mixed income now. Note that all we need
for the tax rate calculations below is the sum OSPUE+PEI. We miss data on household
entrepreneurial income in PEI above. Therefore, we use gross operating surplus and mixed
income of households in order to obtain a measure of household entrepreneurial and mixed
income. For the USA OSPUE is not available in AMECO. We calculate this from the
OECD (HH. Operating surplus and mixed income, gross, national accounts, detailed ag-
gregates). We substract consumption of ﬁxed capital obtained from the OECD (SS14 S15:
Households and non-proﬁt institutions serving households, national accounts) from gross
operating surplus and mixed income in order to obtain a measure of net operating surplus
and mixed income to be used for the tax rate calculations below.
For some European countries the above data starts at a later date than 1995. In ad-
dition, for a few country data time series observations for 2007 are missing. In order to
obtain estimates for 2007 we apply the average growth rates of the last 5 to 20 years to the
observation in 2006. Finally, we use all available individual country data for calculating
weighted averages for the period 1995-2007.57
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D.3.2 Tax Rate Calculations
D.3.3 Eﬀective Tax Rates
Following the methodology of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) we calculate the following
eﬀective tax rates:
Consumption tax: τc = 5110+5121
C+G−GW−5110−5121
Personal income tax: τh = 1100
OSPUE+PEI+W
Labor income tax: τn = τhW+2000+3000
W+2200
Capital income tax: τk =
τh(OSPUE+PEI)+1200+4100+4400
OS
Where C, G and W denote nominal total private consumption, government consump-
tion and wages and salaries.
For the overlapping years 2000 to 2005, our eﬀective tax rates on consumption and
labor income are close to those obtained by Carey and Rabesona’s (2002) recalculation of
the Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994). In particular, the average cross country diﬀerence
in consumption taxes from 2000 to 2005 is -0.3% percent and 0.7% for labor income taxes.
For capital income taxes the diﬀerence is somewhat larger i.e. -4.9%.
Sources of Tax Revenues to GDP Ratios. In the main part of the paper we require data
for sources of tax revenue to GDP ratios. According to the Mendoza, Razin and Tesar
(1994) methodology e.g. the capital tax is calculated as the ratio of capital tax revenues
and the capital tax base. With the above data at hand it is easy to calculate capital tax
revenues and divide them by nominal GDP to obtain the desired statistic. Labor and
consumption tax revenues to GDP ratios are calculated in a similar way.Working PaPer SerieS
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